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IQBAL AND BAD APPLES
by
*
Michael C. Dorf
In addition to its important implications for federal civil procedure, the
Supreme Court’s decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal put the imprimatur of
the Supreme Court on a troubling narrative of the excesses carried out by
the Bush Administration in the name of fighting terrorism. In this “fewbad-apples narrative,” harsh treatment of detainees—especially in the
immediate wake of the attacks of September 11th, but also years later in
such places as Afghanistan, Iraq, the Guantanamo Bay detention
center, and elsewhere—was the work of a small number of relatively lowranking military and civilian officials who went beyond the limits of the
law. The actions of these few bad apples, the narrative goes, were
regrettable but not the result of official policy. Actions and statements by
both the Bush and Obama Administrations promulgated the few-badapples narrative. Careful parsing of both the complaint and the Supreme
Court opinion in Iqbal shows that in dismissing allegations that highranking officials in the Bush Justice Department ordered discriminatory
abuse of detainees, the Court accepted that flawed narrative.
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I.

INTRODUCTION
1

The Supreme Court’s ruling in Ashcroft v. Iqbal has profound
implications for at least two important areas of federal law. First, it makes
2
clear that the Court’s 2007 ruling in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
*
Robert S. Stevens Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. This Essay expands an
argument first sketched in Michael C. Dorf, The Supreme Court Dismisses a 9/11
Detainee’s Civil Lawsuit, FINDLAW’S WRIT, May 20, 2009, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/
dorf/20090520.html. I am grateful for the helpful comments and suggestions of
Kevin Clermont, Sherry Colb, Patrick O’Donnell, Jeffrey Rachlinksi, and Allan Stein.
1
129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
2
127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007).
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establishes rigorous pleading requirements for all federal civil lawsuits.
Twombly and Iqbal require federal district judges to dismiss civil
3
complaints that, after the discarding of “conclusory” allegations, draw
4
inferences that are not “plausible,” in light of the facts pled. Unless
overturned by Congress or the Rules Advisory Committee process, the
Twombly/Iqbal pleading rule will play a potentially decisive role in every
federal civil case.
Second, Iqbal called into question an entire basis for civil liability for
unconstitutional discrimination. The Court rejected “supervisory liability”
for a policy-making official on the basis of “mere knowledge of his
subordinate’s discriminatory purpose,” absent intentional discrimination
5
by the policy maker himself. Yet, according to the dissent, prior
precedent sometimes permitted supervisory liability on the basis of a
supervisor’s “deliberate indifference” to the unconstitutional acts of a
6
subordinate. Although relevant to fewer cases than the holding
regarding the pleading standard, Iqbal’s limitation on supervisory liability
could be dispositive in a substantial number of cases.
Despite their recent vintage, the procedural rulings in Twombly and
Iqbal have already been subject to considerable, and generally critical,
7
scholarly scrutiny, including other essays in this Symposium. Although I
agree with many of those critiques, this Essay focuses on a different
aspect of Iqbal: The fact that it puts the imprimatur of the Supreme Court
on a particular narrative of the excesses carried out by the Bush
Administration in the name of fighting terrorism. According to what I
shall call the “few-bad-apples narrative,” harsh treatment of detainees—
especially in the immediate wake of the attacks of September 11, 2001,
but also years later in such places as Afghanistan, Iraq, the Guantanamo
3

Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949–50; Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1964–65.
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949; Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1974.
5
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.
6
Id. at 1957 (Souter, J., dissenting). The dissent cites Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
825, 828 (1994), in support of the deliberate indifference standard. Farmer involved
an Eighth Amendment claim, rather than an equal protection claim. Thus it does not
clearly refute the majority’s tacit assertion that the deliberate indifference standard
does not apply to equal protection claims. Under the majority view, a supervisor’s
“deliberate indifference” is not the standard for attaching vicarious liability but the
standard for gauging a substantive violation of the Eighth Amendment. Although
prior cases did not rule out this view, the Court itself had previously referred to
“deliberate indifference” as relevant to equal protection claims. See Collins v. City of
Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 119–20 (1992). The issue was at least open. See League
of Women Voters of Ohio v. Brunner, 548 F.3d 463, 476 (6th Cir. 2008) (avoiding the
question whether deliberate indifference or purposeful discrimination is the standard
for supervisory liability in civil rights suit); Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d
224, 244 (3d Cir. 2008) (taking note of a civil complaint raising equal protection
claim based, inter alia, on deliberate indifference, without rejecting liability on that
basis).
7
For a particularly astute critique, see Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell,
Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming Mar. 2010), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1448796.
4
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Bay detention center, and elsewhere—was the work of a relatively small
number of relatively low-ranking military and civilian officials who went
beyond the limits of the law. The actions of these few bad apples, the
narrative goes, were regrettable but not the result of official policy.
Part II of this Essay discusses the abuse of prisoners in the Abu
Ghraib prison in Iraq and the Bush Justice Department’s authorization of
interrogation techniques for high-value detainees that were tantamount
to torture. As I explain with respect to interrogation, in an important
respect the actions of the Obama Administration have further
contributed to, rather than rejected, the few-bad-apples narrative.
Part III parses the Supreme Court’s treatment of the factual
allegations in the Iqbal complaint. The Court finds implausible the
assertion that the Attorney General and the Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) respectively designed and implemented a
policy of confining Arab and Muslim men in harsh conditions on
account of their race, religion, or national origin. That very finding of
implausibility, I argue, continues the few-bad-apples narrative.
Part IV concludes with some observations about the likely impact of a
Supreme Court ruling that tacitly blesses a government whitewash of
official misconduct.
II. THE FEW-BAD-APPLES NARRATIVE
By now, the Bush Administration’s harsh treatment of some
detainees has been well documented. Formerly secret memoranda that
have been made public and interviews of inside actors show how highranking government officials adopted, as official policy, torture and other
harsh techniques of interrogation that violated international and
8
domestic law. High-ranking government attorneys in turn wrote
9
memoranda providing the pretext of legal justification for these policies.
Although apparently devised originally as a means for obtaining
actionable intelligence about imminent terrorist strikes, the abuses
spread.

8
Two of the best accounts for general audiences are JANE MAYER, THE DARK SIDE:
THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW THE WAR ON TERROR TURNED INTO A WAR ON AMERICAN
IDEALS (2008); and PHILIPPE SANDS, TORTURE TEAM: RUMSFELD’S MEMO AND THE
BETRAYAL OF AMERICAN VALUES (2008). For an excellent insider account, see JACK
GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION (2007).
9
See, e.g., Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 2002), reprinted in
THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 172 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L.
Dratel eds., 2005) [hereinafter Bybee Memo] (regarding Standards of Conduct for
Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A).
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A. Abu Ghraib
Consider the rituals of degradation practiced at the Abu Ghraib
prison in Iraq. As summarized by General Taguba’s report, these
included placing detainees in sexually humiliating positions as well as
direct physical harm, such as “[p]unching, slapping, and kicking
10
detainees; jumping on their naked feet.” Why did Americans inflict such
treatment on Iraqi prisoners? We can identify at least three causes.
First, at least some of the personnel selected for duty at Abu Ghraib
11
had experience in the United States as prison guards. Humiliation and
abuse of prisoners—whether by guards or by other prisoners while
guards turn a blind eye, and whether as a means of exercising control or
12
simply done sadistically—are widespread in American prisons. With
little or no training in how to run an orderly, non-abusive military prison,
some American service members simply adopted and adapted their
13
familiar techniques for dealing with U.S. prisoners.
Second, almost anyone placed in the role of prison guard may begin
to exhibit the abusive behaviors that were seen in Abu Ghraib.
Experimental studies and analyses of real-world events confirm that
otherwise “good” people will often behave badly when given the sort of
14
power that prison guards are given. The most infamous of the
experimental studies, conducted by Philip Zimbardo in 1971 using
Stanford students play-acting as guards and prisoners, yielded abuses
that, when photographed, were “practically interchangeable with those of
15
the guards and prisoners in . . . Abu Ghraib.”
Third, abusive interrogation techniques that were approved by the
Bush Administration for high-value terrorism suspects migrated to (and
16
mutated at) Abu Ghraib. Even if never formally authorized for Abu
10

ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE 800TH MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE (Mar.
2004), reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 9 (report by Antonio M. Taguba,
Major Gen., to Commander of Coal. Forces Land Component Command).
11
See Philip Gourevitch & Errol Morris, Annals of War: Exposure, THE NEW YORKER,
Mar. 24, 2008, at 44, 49 (noting the domestic corrections experience of two Abu
Ghraib guards); Edward Wong, Top Commanders Face Questioning on Prison Abuse, N.Y.
TIMES, June 22, 2004, at A1 (noting that Army Specialist Charles Graner, charged as
the “ringleader” of abusive guards in Abu Ghraib, was a former corrections officer in
the United States).
12
See John T. Parry, Torture Nation, Torture Law, 97 GEO. L.J. 1001, 1022–28
(2009).
13
Cf. DARIUS REJALI, TORTURE AND DEMOCRACY 315 (2007) (noting that “most
techniques that appeared at Abu Ghraib had appeared first in American prisons and
plantations, British ships and bases, and French prisons and penal camps in the
colonies”).
14
See generally PHILIP ZIMBARDO, THE LUCIFER EFFECT: UNDERSTANDING HOW GOOD
PEOPLE TURN EVIL (2007).
15
Id. at 20.
16
See FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT PANEL TO REVIEW DOD DETENTION
OPERATIONS (Aug. 2004), reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 9 [hereinafter
THE SCHLESINGER REPORT] (commonly named after the chairman of the independent
panel the report describes “Interrogation techniques intended only for Guantanamo
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Ghraib, some of the prisoner abuses that occurred in that prison were
nevertheless formally authorized by high-ranking civilian and military
17
officials.
It is thus fair to say that what happened at Abu Ghraib resulted from
a combination of on-the-ground decisions by low-ranking military
18
members (and CIA and civilian contractors) and official decisions by
high-ranking government officials. Reading the record as a whole, it is
hard to disagree with the conclusion of a Human Rights Watch report:
the “pattern of abuse [at Abu Ghraib] did not result from the acts of
individual soldiers who broke the rules. It resulted from decisions made
19
by the Bush administration to bend, ignore, or cast rules aside.” Yet
despite extensive evidence in the public record belying the claim that the
Abu Ghraib abuses were the work of a few sadistic bad apples, no one
20
above the rank of sergeant was ever charged with any offense.
B. The Obama Administration’s Complicity in the Few-Bad-Apples Narrative
The Bush Administration worked assiduously to promote the fewbad-apples narrative. Both before and after the torture memos found
their way into the public record, President Bush insisted that his
21
Administration did not and would not authorize torture. That insistence
was either an outright lie or at best relied on the very questionable
definition of “torture” that appeared in the memoranda his Justice
Department prepared to authorize waterboarding and other techniques
22
that had previously been deemed “torture.” By publicly declaring that
came to be used in Afghanistan and Iraq”). See also Philip Gourevitch, Interrogating
Torture, THE NEW YORKER, May 11, 2009, at 33 (describing how such practices as
“walling” drifted to Abu Ghraib).
17
See Gourevitch, supra note 16, at 33.
18
See THE SCHLESINGER REPORT, supra note 16, at 942 (discussing the role of
contractors and CIA officers in interrogations at Abu Ghraib).
19
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 1 (2004), available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/usa0604/usa0604.pdf.
20
Two officers were subject to non-judicial discipline: Brigadier General Janis
Karpinski and Colonel Thomas Pappas. See David Wood, Abu Ghraib Commander is
Cleared of Conviction, BALTIMORE SUN, Jan. 11, 2008, at A7.
21
See, e.g., Peter Slevin, U.S. Pledges to Avoid Torture: Pledge on Terror Suspects Comes
Amid Probes of Two Deaths, WASH. POST, JUN. 27, 2003, at A11 (“The United States is
committed to the worldwide elimination of torture and we are leading this fight by
example.” (quoting President Bush)); Melissa McNamara, Bush: ‘We Don’t Torture’:
President Tells Katie Couric That Connecting Iraq to War On Terror Is Hardest Part Of His
Job, CBS EVENING NEWS, Sept. 6, 2006, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/
09/06/eveningnews/main1979106.shtml (“I’ve said to the people that we don’t
torture, and we don’t.”).
22
See, e.g., Bybee Memo, supra note 9, at 183 (asserting that, in order for
interrogation methods to constitute torture, “[t]he victim must experience intense
pain or suffering of the kind that is equivalent to the pain that would be associated
with serious physical injury so severe that death, organ failure, or permanent damage
resulting in a loss of significant body function will likely result. If that pain or
suffering is psychological . . . . these acts must cause long-term mental harm.”).
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official policy condemned torture, Bush tacitly but unmistakably signaled
that abuses of prisoners were the result of isolated, rogue actors.
Even as he has initiated steps to change interrogation practices
23
prospectively, President Obama has, through his actions, accepted the
24
core of the few-bad-apples narrative. In April 2009, the Obama Justice
Department released four previously confidential memoranda prepared
25
during the Bush Administration. These memoranda show that
waterboarding, slamming prisoners into walls, slapping them, and
confining a prisoner in a box with insects were matters of carefully
considered policy. In a statement accompanying the release of the
memoranda, Attorney General Holder renounced their legal reasoning
but also made clear that the Justice Department would not prosecute any
intelligence officer who had conducted interrogations in reliance on the
26
prior assurances of the techniques’ legality. Nor has the Obama
Administration shown any appetite for prosecuting any of the highranking Bush Administration officials who conceived or provided the
pretext of legal justification for the policy of prisoner abuse.
However, Attorney General Holder did appoint a prosecutor to
investigate and possibly prosecute perpetrators of detainee abuse that was
27
not specifically authorized. The rogues either used approved methods,
such as waterboarding, beyond their authorization or improvised
additional torments, such as mock executions, blowing smoke in
prisoners’ faces, threatening prisoners’ family members, and other forms
28
of abuse. While illegal under U.S. and international law, these
unauthorized abuses are not clearly worse than some of the techniques
that the Bush Administration did authorize. Blowing smoke in a
detainee’s face, while undoubtedly humiliating, uncomfortable, and
unhealthy, does seem less of an offense than repeatedly drowning a
prisoner nearly to the point of asphyxiation.
23

See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Special Task Force on Interrogations
and Transfer Policies Issues its Recommendations to the President (Aug. 24, 2009),
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2009/August/09-ag-835.html (proposing that the
Army Field Manual govern interrogations).
24
Pun perceived but not intended.
25
The memoranda are collected in Justice Department Memos on Interrogation
Techniques, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2009, http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/
images/nytint/docs/justice-department-memos-on-interrogation-techniques/
original.pdf.
26
See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Department of Justice Releases Four
Office of Legal Counsel Opinions (Apr. 16, 2009), http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/
2009/April/09-ag-356.html.
27
See Mark Mazzetti & Scott Shane, Investigation Is Ordered Into C.I.A. Abuse
Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2009, at A1.
28
A redacted version of the 2004 report on which Attorney General Holder
relied in deciding to go forward with the investigation was released in August 2009
and made available in C.I.A. Reports on Interrogation Methods, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2009,
http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/images/nytint/docs/c-i-a-reports-oninterrogation-methods/original.pdf. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., CIA, SPECIAL
REVIEW: COUNTERTERRORISM DETENTION AND INTERROGATION ACTIVITIES (2004).
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What explains the decision to prosecute the rogue interrogators but
not the policy designers and justifiers? Partly, the answer may be diffusion
of responsibility. President Obama assigned to Attorney General Holder
the task of determining whether to investigate low-ranking officials,
applying the Justice Department’s ordinary standards regarding the
exercise of prosecutorial discretion. In principle, the investigation that
the Attorney General has unleashed could lead to indictments of former
high-ranking officials in the Bush Administration, perhaps even
including the former Vice President and President. In fact, however, it
appears that President Obama made a political decision that
prosecutions should not be pursued for the high-ranking officials,
reasoning that, with respect to what would inevitably be seen as a partisan
investigation, it would be better for the country to engage in “reflection,
29
not retribution,” and thus to “move forward.”
Yet what explains President Obama’s simultaneous decision to
delegate to the Attorney General the decision to make an apolitical
judgment about the prosecution of the low-ranking officials? One could
take the view that all of the nation’s legal obligations are merely
presumptive obligations, defeasible by a sufficiently compelling
justification. If so, one would only want the decision to violate a legal
obligation to be made at the very highest level, by policy makers who
have access to a wide range of information and at least a bit of time to
think through the consequences of their decisions. Front-line officers
would then be permitted to carry out the instructions of such policy
makers—even if those instructions appear to authorize illegal activity
(such as waterboarding)—but would otherwise be held to obey the letter
of the law.
The chief difficulty with the foregoing rationale for the decision to
subject little fish but not big fish to the possibility of prosecution is that it
would entail that the high-ranking Bush Administration officials who
designed and justified the detainee interrogation policy were actually
acting within their authority when they concluded that waterboarding and
other torments were legally permissible. However, the Obama
Administration has not said that, nor does it apparently believe it.
Indeed, President Obama has not offered any non-political rationale for
giving Attorney General Holder permission to bring prosecutions against
little fish but not big fish. That silence by the Obama Administration has

29
Statement on the Release of Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel
Memos Concerning Interrogation Techniques, DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 200900263
(Apr. 16, 2009), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-200900263/
pdf/DCPD-200900263.pdf. Speaking with George Stephanopoulos of ABC News just
after the release of President Obama’s statement, White House Chief of Staff Rahm
Emanuel made clear that it reflected a decision not to prosecute the Bush
Administration officials who designed the policy. See George Stephanopoulos, Obama
Administration: No Prosecution of Officials for Bush-Era Torture Policy, ABC NEWS, Apr. 19,
2009, http://blogs.abcnews.com/george/2009/04/obama-adminis-1.html.
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the foreseeable effect of reinforcing the few-bad-apples narrative of what
went wrong under President Bush.
Perhaps it is unfair to criticize a President for taking into account
political considerations in deciding whom to prosecute. Presidents are,
after all, political actors. As Justice Scalia explained in his dissent in
Morrison v. Olson—a lone position that has grown in authority since it was
essentially vindicated by Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr’s runaway
investigation of President Clinton—the decision whether to pursue a
prosecution is inevitably and appropriately political (though not in the
30
partisan sense). Courts, by contrast, are understood as following the law
in a narrower sense. It is thus especially unfortunate that the Supreme
Court in the Iqbal case added its own imprimatur to the few-bad-apples
narrative, as the next Part explains.
III. THE SUPREME COURT’S ACCEPTANCE OF THE FEW-BADAPPLES NARRATIVE IN IQBAL
Javaid Iqbal is a Pakistani man who alleged in a federal lawsuit that
while he was in custody on immigration charges following the aftermath
of the September 11th attacks, his jailors “kicked him in the stomach,
31
punched him in the face, and dragged him across” his cell. He further
alleged that he was gratuitously strip-searched; and denied the
opportunity to pray—and that all of this was done to him pursuant to a
policy of discrimination on the basis of race, religion, and national
32
The Supreme Court’s opinion finding the complaint
origin.
insufficiently plausible to satisfy the pleading standard of Federal Rule of
33
Civil Procedure 8(a) closely follows the few-bad-apples narrative.
The Court begins by acknowledging that Iqbal’s “account of his
prison ordeal could, if proved, demonstrate unconstitutional misconduct
34
by some governmental actors.” Which actors, exactly? The Court notes
that potentially liable defendants include “the correctional officers who
had day-to-day contact with” Iqbal and the wardens of the facility where
he was held, but not former Attorney General Ashcroft or former FBI
35
Director Mueller. Then, after explaining why in the majority’s view the
complaint was insufficient with respect to Ashcroft and Mueller, it once
again states that the opinion does not dispose of the claims against low-

30

487 U.S. 654, 707–08 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Almost all investigative
and prosecutorial decisions—including the ultimate decision whether, after a
technical violation of the law has been found, prosecution is warranted—involve the
balancing of innumerable legal and practical considerations. Indeed, even political
considerations (in the nonpartisan sense) must be considered.”).
31
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1944 (2009).
32
Id.
33
See id. at 1953–54.
34
Id. at 1942.
35
Id. at 1943–45.
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ranking officials. Those allegations, the Court says, detail “serious official
36
misconduct.”
That, in a nutshell, is the few-bad-apples narrative. The Justices, no
less than the Bush and Obama Administrations, are content to imagine
that prisoner abuses—in this case occurring in a federal maximum
security prison in Brooklyn rather than at Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo Bay,
or a CIA black site—were the work of low-level rogue actors, not highranking Bush Administration officials.
To be sure, as a formal matter, the Iqbal opinion addresses the
sufficiency of pleadings rather than ultimate responsibility. However,
careful parsing of the complaint and of the opinion reveals that the latter
rests on the few-bad-apples narrative.
The allegation that the Court finds implausible—and thus that
warrants dismissal of the complaint against Ashcroft and Mueller under
the Twombly/Iqbal pleading standard—is the claim that the defendants
purposefully designated Arab and Muslim detainees as “of high interest,”
and thus subject to the harsh conditions of confinement they
37
encountered, “because of their race, religion, or national origin.”
Justice Kennedy says for the Court that “given more likely explanations,”
38
these allegations “do not plausibly establish this purpose.”
What are the more likely explanations? The Court notes that all of
the September 11th hijackers were Arab Muslims, and therefore, it is not
surprising that the most promising leads would disproportionately point
39
to Arabs and Muslims. In other words, focusing on the contacts of the
known hijackers and working outward from there, the investigation
ended up scrutinizing many more Arabs and Muslims than one would
find in a random cross-section of the population. However, the Court
says, it is not plausible to infer that Ashcroft and Mueller respectively
devised and implemented a racial or religious profile for designating
40
high-interest suspects. It is so much more likely that the disparate
impact on Arabs and Muslims was unintended that the allegation of a
41
purposeful policy of discrimination is not even plausible.
Civil proceduralists are understandably exercised about the Court’s
use of a plausibility standard in the first place. But even given that
standard, the Court’s further conclusion that the allegations against
Ashcroft and Mueller are implausible is still troubling.
Iqbal’s complaint listed twenty-four claims against over thirty named
defendants and an additional nineteen “John Doe” defendants, with
42
various defendants named in some but not all claims. The claims fell
36

Id. at 1952.
Id. at 1951.
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
See id.
42
See Second Amended Complaint and Jury Demand at 34–56, Elmaghraby v.
Ashcroft, No. 04 CV 1809 (JG)(SMG) (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 2005) (on file with Lewis &
37
38
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broadly into two categories: those seeking recovery because of the nature
of the harm inflicted on Iqbal and his co-plaintiff, Ehad Elmaghraby; and
those seeking recovery because of harm done on account of race,
national origin, and religion. Ashcroft and Mueller were named in only
two of the claims that alleged a harm unrelated to discrimination: the
second claim, which alleged a due process violation in assigning the
plaintiffs to the harsh conditions of the maximum security prison in
which they were held; and the twenty-first claim, which alleged cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment in violation of customary international
43
law. They were named as defendants in five claims alleging various
44
forms of unlawful discrimination.
Putting aside the two claims not based on allegations of
discrimination, which were not within the scope of the Supreme Court’s
grant of certiorari, is there a basis in the complaint for distinguishing
between the claims against Ashcroft and Mueller, on the one hand, and
the lower-ranking officials, on the other? Superficial analysis suggests that
the answer is yes.
The factual allegations of the complaint repeatedly describe
incidents during which, in the course of mistreating the plaintiffs, one or
45
more prison officials disparaged them for being Muslim. These
episodes, it might be thought, render plausible the conclusion that the
particular officials who manifested religious prejudice against the
plaintiffs were in fact engaged in unlawful discrimination. By contrast,
the plaintiffs alleged no direct evidence that either Ashcroft or Mueller
was prejudiced against Muslims or Arabs.
Yet that is at best a superficial explanation because, as the Supreme
Court’s equal protection cases make clear, the gravamen of a prima facie
complaint of unlawful discrimination is not hatred or prejudice; it is
46
simply racial or religious classification. Indeed, the Court seems to
recognize that an allegation of purposeful racial or religious
classification, even absent racial or religious animus, would, if proven, be
47
sufficient to subject Ashcroft and Mueller to liability. The Court does
not say that Ashcroft and Mueller had shown no animus towards Arabs
and Muslims. The Court simply denies that Ashcroft and Mueller were
48
taking account of the plaintiffs’ race, national origin, or religion at all.

Clark Law Review). Using a nomenclature generally disfavored in federal court under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), the complaint styled each claim a “cause of
action.” Id.
43
Id. at 35–36, 52–53.
44
See id. at 42–44, 46, 48 (claims 11–13, 16, and 17).
45
See id. at 16–18, 21 (paragraphs 87, 96, 113, and 120).
46
See, e.g., Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1,
127 S. Ct. 2738, 2751 (2007) (“[W]hen the government distributes burdens or
benefits on the basis of individual racial classifications, that action is reviewed under
strict scrutiny.”).
47
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1951 (2009).
48
Id.
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Yet the allegation that the detainees sent to the abusive maximum
security prison unit were disproportionately Arab and Muslim, combined
with the allegations of actual incidents of guards’ express prejudice
alleged in the complaint, would seem to make out a more-than-plausible
prima facie case that the underlying policy designed and implemented by
Ashcroft and Mueller targeted Arab and Muslim men for confinement
under the harsh conditions of the maximum security prison. Perhaps the
Justices think that a potentially burdensome lawsuit against the Attorney
General and FBI Director should require still more, or that the standard
for overcoming qualified immunity in cases against such high-ranking
officials should be elevated. The Court says nothing of the sort, however.
Purporting to apply a standard applicable in all civil litigation, the
majority simply asserts that the inference that Ashcroft and Mueller had
relied on race, national origin, or religion in deciding whom to treat as
49
high-value suspects is not plausible.
Here then is the picture that the Supreme Court paints of the
domestic situation shortly after September 11th: Arab and Muslim men
are disproportionately sent to a maximum security prison unit, where
they are subjected to harsh treatment by prison authorities who
repeatedly state that, as Muslims and terrorists, they deserve no better,
but it is simply not plausible to think that the pervasive and
discriminatory abuse resulted from instructions by the Attorney General
or the FBI Director. The Court reaches this conclusion even though
there is clear evidence in the public record that a similar pattern of
abusing Arab and Muslim prisoners occurred in Iraq, and that pattern
50
was a result of official policy. Yet the inference that the prison
authorities in Brooklyn were acting on orders seems at least as plausible
as the correct inference that the Abu Ghraib culprits were acting (more
or less) on orders. The Iqbal complaint alleged abuses that occurred in
the immediate wake of September 11th, when all government officials
and especially the Attorney General and the FBI Director, were under
enormous pressure to act to prevent what they understandably imagined
would be another terrorist attack. It is hardly fantastical or even
implausible to think that they would have ordered prison officials to
“take the gloves off” when interrogating Arab and Muslim men.
The Court’s failure to see in Iqbal’s complaint a plausible allegation
of official policy is best explained by the Court’s acceptance of the fewbad-apples narrative. Human beings, including Supreme Court Justices,
are prone to view facts as conforming to pre-existing stock scripts or
51
narratives. In Iqbal, the majority simply took for granted that, as between
the few-bad-apples account of the abuses Iqbal allegedly suffered and the
account alleged in his complaint—in which the Attorney General and the
FBI Director ordered the discriminatory treatment—the few-bad-apples
49
50
51

Id. at 1941, 1951.
See supra Part II.A.
See ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 47 (2000).
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narrative was the more plausible. The Justices thus blinded themselves to
52
the possibility that the world did not conform to their narrative.
IV. CONCLUSION
What harm was done by the Supreme Court’s acceptance of the fewbad-apples narrative in Iqbal? In answering that question it is tempting to
repair to Justice Jackson’s famous warning in his dissenting opinion in
53
Korematsu v. United States. Accepting that courts may lack the practical
authority to stop an unconstitutional military order in real time, he
nonetheless objected to post hoc judicial rationalization of such an order,
warning that the rationalizing “principle then lies about like a loaded
weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a
54
plausible claim of an urgent need.” The Supreme Court’s decision in
Iqbal will be used by other litigants; indeed, its civil procedure holding
has already done an enormous amount of work (or, depending on one’s
views about the costs and benefits of litigation, damage). But with respect
to the few-bad-apples narrative, the worry is not so much that other
courts, or the Supreme Court itself, will apply the Iqbal principle in future
cases. Instead, we should worry that the Court’s acceptance of the fewbad-apples narrative normalizes the underlying abuses.
Anybody who has followed the public debate over the Bush
Administration detainee policy with even passing interest is by now aware
that key actors, especially former Vice President Cheney, have not only
failed to hide the fact that torments such as waterboarding were official
policy; they have affirmatively boasted that such practices were justified in
55
the interest of national security. That taking “credit” may seem
inconsistent with the simultaneous effort to insist that abuses were the
result of low-ranking officers acting on their own. However, the two
seemingly contradictory narratives in fact work in tandem: By nominally
denying official responsibility for whatever the public deems worst about
detainee treatment, those who promulgate the few-bad-apples narrative
are tacitly saying that the authorized procedures were acceptable.
Consider an analogy to Holocaust denial. Some people who deny the
historical fact of the Nazi murder of six million Jews do so in order to
delegitimize the state of Israel as providing a haven for surviving Jews
who were chased out of Europe. However, other Holocaust deniers (and
some of the Holocaust deniers just described as well) are themselves neoNazis or Nazi sympathizers. One might think that a real contemporary
Nazi would want to complete the Holocaust rather than deny it. But to
52
See id. at 113 (“Well-wrought narratives are so successful in making their
answers to these questions seem like ‘the real thing’ that they virtually blind us to the
subtle architecture of their construction.”).
53
323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
54
Id.
55
See Rachel L. Swarns, Cheney Offers Sharp Defense of C.I.A. Tactics, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 31, 2009, at A1.
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say so openly—or too openly—would discredit the neo-Nazi, and so
instead of expressly advocating a renewed campaign of anti-Semitic
genocide, contemporary neo-Nazis thinly veil their advocacy of Nazi
policies as a claim about the historical record. European governments
that ban Holocaust denial but do not ban most other, equally false,
claims of historical fact correctly understand that Holocaust denial is a
form of Holocaust advocacy. Likewise, to choose another analogy, juries
that acquit defendants accused of acquaintance rape may sometimes be
denying that the sex was non-consensual as a means of “really” making
the nominally unacceptable normative judgment that the defendant’s
56
conduct was not harmful.
So too in Iqbal, the core problem with the Supreme Court’s
acceptance of the few-bad-apples narrative may be its implicit normative
57
content, rather than its factual content. If we understand that the fewbad-apples narrative functions as a means of justification by denial, then
we can recognize that the Supreme Court’s Iqbal opinion, in accepting
that narrative, lent its imprimatur to the normalization of discriminatory
58
detainee abuse. I would like to think that the Court did so unwittingly.
After all, a majority of the Justices did stand up to the Bush
Administration’s most sweeping claims in justification of its detention
59
policies. But wittingly or not, the damage has been done.

56

See Sherry F. Colb, “Whodunit” Versus “What Was Done”: When to Admit Character
Evidence in Criminal Cases, 79 N.C. L. REV. 939, 991 (2001) (describing the denial
intrinsic to a jury decision to construct a stranger rape as no crime).
57
Lest there be any doubt, I do not mean that the detainee policies of the Bush
Administration or those who, whether intentionally or unintentionally have
rationalized those policies, are remotely comparable in their loathsomeness to the
Nazi Holocaust. I have invoked the phenomenon of Holocaust denial simply because
it is the best example I know of denial serving as a cover for justification.
58
“Perhaps,” as Stanley Cohen says about official denials more broadly, the
former Administration officials who simultaneously take credit for and deny prisoner
abuse, and all of us who accept this contradiction “have already entered a postmodern version of the Oedipal state: knowing and not-knowing at the same time, but
also not caring.” STANLEY COHEN, STATES OF DENIAL: KNOWING ABOUT ATROCITIES AND
SUFFERING 115–16 (2001).
59
See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2240 (2008); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,
126 S. Ct. 2749, 2758–59 (2006); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 508, 537 (2004);
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 469, 481–82 (2004).

